

# Evolution of Standards for High-Integrity Software in Railways

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### Introduction

#### BS EN 50128:2001

Railway applications. Communications, signalling and processing systems. Software for railway control and protection systems

Published: 15 May 2001 · Withdrawn: 31 Jul 2011

BS EN 50128:2011+A2:2020 Incorporating corrigendum February 2014



**BSI Standards Publication** 

BS EN 50716:2023

Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - Software for railway control and protection systems

This presentation outlines how standards for high integrity software in railways have evolved, starting from the earliest applications in railway signalling



**BSI Standards Publication** 

Railway Applications — Requirements for software development





## The Signalling System

An interlocking is a system which allows a train to proceed only when all relevant conditions are safe.



## Interlocking Technology

#### Mid 20<sup>th</sup> Century



### Equipment Room



Relay



- Smaller buildings
- Less cabling
- Less installation work
- Quicker and cheaper application design was hoped for ("it's only software") but achievement questionable.





Lineside object controller

Central Interlocking



### **Evolutionary Timeline**







### **CENELEC** Process for Standards



## Working Groups

- Experts nominated by national standards organisations, e.g.
  BSI, volunteered by their employers.
- Usually act as individuals rather than national delegates.
- Can be multiple experts per country.



Expert being volunteered to a WG

### Essence of EN50128



### **Safety Management**



Organisation



Documentation





### **Techniques and Measures**

- Techniques which reduce the probability of software defects being introduced, e.g. improved programming languages, structured programming;
- Techniques which can show that the software will behave correctly, e.g. white box testing, symbolic execution;
- Techniques which detect anomalies but which do not show that software will behave correctly, e.g. structural analysis, data flow analysis

## Examples of Requirements for Safety Management



#### **Organisation – Roles and Responsibilities** Important to ensure independence of roles with safety

responsibilities, e.g. Verifier independent of Designer



Independence of Roles ( Sometimes called the "4 eyes principle" but 2 brains is better

### Documentation

Many specific documents are required.

Do not despise documentation. System development and safety assurance are **sociotechnical** processes. Without good documentation the **SOCIO** part won't work and the **TECHNICAL** part will go wrong!



- Plans
- Specification
- Designs
- Analyses
- Reports



## Techniques and SIL



20+ tables of recommended techniques and measures.

To claim that a required SIL has been achieved, all relevant approved combinations must be used.

Note: In all versions of the standard, the recommendations for SIL1 and SIL 2, and for SIL3 and SIL4 are always the same

TECHNIQUE/MEASURE	Ref.	SWSIL 0	SWSIL 1	SWSIL 2	SWSIL 3	SWSIL 4
1. Formal Proof	B.31	-	R	R	HR	HR
2. Probabilistic Testing	B.47	-	R	R	HR	HR
3. Static Analysis	dt8	-	HR	HR	HR	HR
4. Dynamic Analysis and Testing		-	HR	HR	HR	HR
5. Metrics		-	R	R	R	R
6. Traceability Matrix	B.69	-	R	R	HR	HR
7. Software Error Effect Analysis	B26	-	R	R	HR	HR
Requirements						
1. For Software Safety Integrity Level 3 or 4, the approved combinations of techniques shall be:						
a) 1 and 4						
or b) 3 and 4						
or c) 4, 6 and 7						
2. For Software Safety Integrity Level 1 or 2, the approved combinations of techniques shall be:						
a) 1						
or b) 3 and 4						
or c) 4						

#### Table A.5 – Verification and Testing (clause 11)

## **Configuration Logic and Data**



**Geographical Data** Repeated for **Data Preparation** each application System Signalling Logic Logic Management, (I/O, Comms, etc.) NO 19 AND 28 SLOTTED BY METROPOLITA The High-integrity **Operating System** Engine Safety Management Area under control Fixed for all Hardware applications

> Signal interlocking systems need to be configured to the area under control

All versions of the Standard include a chapter on development of application logic and data

## Structure of EN50128





All normative except Annex B

## Changes in EN50128:2011



### 2001 version

Perso	onnel and responsibilities	17
6.1	Objective	17
6.2	Requirements	18

### 2011 version

5	Software management and organisation	8
5.1	Organisation, roles and responsibilities	18
5.2	Personnel competence	21

Annex B

(normative)

Includes requirements for competence

Key software roles and responsibilities

### Organisational requirements expanded

- Key responsibilities more fully defined
- Competence requirements now included

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## Changes in EN50128:2011



#### 2001 version

Life	e cycle issues and documentation	19
7.1	Objectives	19
7.2	Requirements	19
	2011 version	
5.3	Lifecycle issues and documentation	22
6	Software assurance	24
6.1	Software testing	24
6.2	Software verification	26

- Additional requirements for documentation, including generic requirements for document quality.
- Additional generic requirements for software assurance.
- Generic requirements for support tools.
- SIL0 becomes Basic Integrity.



## EN 50657:2017 – Software for Rolling Stock

- Effectively EN 50128:2011 adapted to rolling stock applications.
- Changes mainly concerned with terminology.
- Structure and technical content transposed from EN 50128.
- Minor technical changes.



## Changes in EN50716:2023



- Merged with EN 50657:2017
- Role independence requirements simplified

Various special cases and relaxations dropped

Additional guidance on:
Alternative Lifecycles
Modelling
Al/ML
Also detailed changes in recommended techniques, e.g. recommending properties of programming languages rather than specific languages.

## Lifecycles



Software Architecture

Version 1

Version 2 Results for

**Results for Part 1** 

Version 2

Results for Parts 1 and 2

Results for Parts 1, 2 and 3 (complete document)

Verification Report



Example of Iterative Lifecycle

Example of iterative development of a work product

## Modelling



"A model is a logical representation aimed at developing, understanding, communicating, or explaining aspects of a system, entity, or process."

The annex provides guidance on how to apply the requirements of the standard when modelling is used in software development.

SUBCLAUSES TYPICAL ADAPTATION FOR MODELLING 7.5.4.2 The size and complexity of the 7.5.4.2 The size and complexity of the developed model shall be balanced. developed source code shall be balanced. 7.5.4.3 The Software Source Code shall be 7.5.4.3 The model shall be readable. understandable and testable. readable, understandable and testable. 7.5.4.4 The Software Source Code shall be 7.5.4.4 The model shall be placed under placed under configuration control before the configuration control before the commencement of commencement of documented testing. documented testing. ----------

Table C.2 — Component implementation and testing typical adaptation for modelling

During the years between 1980 and the appearance of the first version of the standard in 2001, much work was published on representations (models as defined above by EN50716) which would have alleviated some of the problems of system development. The delay in their recognition is surprising.



## AI and Functional Safety – State of the Art

PD ISO/IEC TR 5469:2024



**BSI Standards Publication** 

Artificial intelligence — Functional safety and AI systems

Al technology Class III covers applications which would be classed as SIL1 – SIL 4 in EN 50716

AI Technology Class => AI application and usage level	AI technology Class I	AI technology Class II	AI technology Class III	
Usage Level A1 (1)	Application of risk reduction concepts of existing functional safety International Standards	Appropriate set of requirements (3)		
Usage Level A2 (1)		Appropriate set of requirements (3)	At the time of writing this document no appropriate set of	
Usage Level B1 (1)		Appropriate set of requirements (3)	properties with related methods and	
Usage Level B2 (1)	possible	Appropriate set of requirements (3)	techniques is known to achieve sufficiently reduction of risk	
Usage Level C (1)		Appropriate set of requirements (3)		
Usage Level D (2)	No specific functional safety requirements for AI technology, but application of risk reduction concepts of existing functional safety International Standards			

### AI Classification Table from TR 5469

### AI/ML Gaps in EN50716



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